Introduction
If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help integrate, consolidate, and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk paying a much high price later.
-William S. Cohen
The primary questions driving this research paper are simple. What lies ahead for the new NATO invitees, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic, as they work towards integration into NATO? More specifically, what political and economic hurdles must be overcome and planned for before NATO membership is a reality? Recognizing that NATO is a military alliance, how will the militaries of those countries be affected?
Background
Expanding NATO is an explosive topic around the world. It has generated in-depth discussions and writings ranging from highly opinionated newspaper articles to detailed cost analysis in the United States Congress. Even so, many people do not understand why NATO still exists, let alone why it is on the verge of expanding, long after the primary threat, the Soviet Union, is no longer on the other side of the Fulda Gap. This "puzzlement stems from an analytical yardstick that ties NATO to the single purpose of providing for collective defence."
1 NATO is a military instrument but remains a political tool and is a key instrument through which the new European security identity is being formed.
Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic each have work to do before they fully meet
Western standards of democratic rule and stable market economies. Simply in preparation to joining NATO, new military members must comply with over 1200 agreements and publications. 2 Still, no issue has dominated the internal political agenda of the three countries as much as their desire to belong to NATO. Membership in the Western alliance has an obvious benefit in that, as a general rule, countries building their foundations along democratic principles do not go to war with each other. The goal of membership in NATO also helped these respective governments overcome difficult times as they rebuilt their internal political and economic engines, with former communists and non-communists working together to make it all happen. Gaining membership in NATO is not easy or automatic, as Slovakia discovered. "One lesson clearly taken to heart by Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary was the elimination of Slovakia from the list of potential NATO members after its Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, became increasingly authoritarian. Similarly, the European Union has cited Slovakia's lack of democratic process as a reason for its exclusion from the first round of the economic union's eastward expansion." 3 Members of the international community do notice the hard work that goes into the political and economical rebuilding of a country. The U.S. ambassador to Poland, Daniel
Fried, who helped formulate the arguments for expanding NATO, points to the way the three countries have behaved toward each other as they became more confident of their NATO membership. He said "they increased their outreach to their neighbors -Hungary to Romania, and Poland to Lithuania." 4 Hungary and Romania, potential adversaries in the not too distant past, signed a treaty guaranteeing each other's borders and respecting the rights of the 1 million plus Hungarian minority in Romania.
Implications of membership for new members
The commitments entered into by new member states must be the same as for present members, including acceptance of the principles, policies, and procedures already adopted by all members of the Alliance. The willingness and the ability to meet these commitments, not only on paper but also in practice, is critical. The inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will add approximately 200,000 troops to the Alliance. These countries are forcefully committed to this contribution. They already deployed more than 1,000 troops to the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, and Hungary made the military base at Taszar available to U.S. troops.
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A study undertaken by NATO in 1995 showed there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join, but there is a substantial list of political and military expectations. Topping the list of political expectations is to conform to basic principles embodied in NATO's core document, sometimes referred to as the Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The study did emphasize three broad areas of attention for the countries to prepare themselves politically for membership. First, a demonstrated commitment to and respect for the norms and principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE). Second, a commitment to promoting stability and well being by economic liberty, social justice, and environmental responsibility. Finally, establishing appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defense force. 6 Looking through a Western democratic lens, these requirements do not appear to be difficult, yet when viewed through a sociopolitical setting dominated by decades of communism, one sees a tremendous amount of inertia to overcome.
At the top of the list of military expectations is that new members must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits, and burdens of common security and collective defense. Preparing militarily is an extensive process. Each of the three countries must adapt themselves to NATO's strategy and force structure that are designed to exploit multinationality and flexibility. The NATO cornerstones are standardization of doctrines and procedures, interoperability of command, control, and communications, major weapon systems, and combat supplies. One facet of command and control is language. English is the primary language of NATO and herein lies a serious challenge.
A majority of conscripts and officers alike in all the services of the three countries do not speak English.
Standardizing weapon systems is part of the process the militaries must undergo, and this has already led to a mad scramble by companies and trade groups seeking to lock in their share of the next global arms bazaar. Billions of dollars are at stake as the NATO invitees prepare to boost their military spending anywhere from 20 to 35 percent. Senior members in NATO are, to some extent, downplaying the need for the three countries to rush out and spend huge sums on the upgrade of their equipment, realizing that these figures could put huge dampers on public support within each of these countries.
Currently the level of public support ranges from 90 percent in Poland to 60 percent in the Czech Republic, but if too much emphasis is placed on guns and not on continued economic and other internal reform, resentment of the costs to join NATO may build quickly. One of the prices to pay for being in a free market economy is accountability for decisions. Do the leaders of these countries want to quickly live up to the international expectations and upgrade their militaries as fast as possible at the expense of their countries' economic wellbeing, or will they not bow to outside pressures and keep on a slower but steady pace? Additional pressure, in the form of special incentives and grants from international arms dealers will be intense, considering the amount of money at stake. In 1997, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland reportedly received $30 million from a $60 million Pentagon grant program. Some estimates put the potential market for fighter jets at $10 billion, a sum which exceeds the three nation's combined annual defense budgets.
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Time will tell how each government responds to these pressures. Poland is making the most progress to date, but none of the countries have yet published a definitive long-range budget on how they will pay for these expenditures.
The cost estimates for expanding NATO have varied wildly. Initial U.S.
Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimates in 1997 ranged between $27 -35 billion, whereas a NATO estimate comes in at $1.5 billion. 8 Part of this vast difference is the method of computation. The GAO studies included the costs the invitees themselves would bear whereas the NATO study did not. Officials from each of the three countries have stressed that it would cost more to pay for their defense outside NATO than inside. Hence, the more realistic numbers for measuring the impact on current NATO members are those that only reflect the costs to be born by the current members.
How close these estimates are remains to be seen.
Limitations of the study
Recognizing that numerous topics are interrelated with this particular NATO expansion issue, this paper will focus on the political, economic, and military aspects of the inclusion of the invitees. It is recognized that there are other topics which would certainly complement this paper as future research projects. These topics include:
1. Arguments for and against expanding NATO 2. Russian reaction to NATO expansion 3. Isolation of countries outside of NATO such as Romania and Slovakia
Methodology
The sources used in this study come from several main categories with most of them accessible through the Internet. The first main category is material published by NATO. Service provided a broad range of topics from the internal perspective of each country.
These views brought out hardships and challenges not presented in other publications.
Combined, these sources present a balanced base for this study without relying on any single, possibly biased or overly optimistic category for information. 
Politics
Of the three invitees, Poland leads the way to NATO membership. Poland's struggle to find political stability has gone on for many years and developed into two main political parties. One of these, Solidarity, is in reality more of an umbrella for more than three dozen groups; the main parties of which are developed from radically different roots, communist and non-communist. Within the context of global economic and political change, with ever-increasing economic interdependence, each party is slowly moving toward the political center. Poland has held six free elections at various levels of government since the fall of communism in 1989. Poland's democratic norms, include the division of powers among the President, the Council of Ministers, the legislative and judicial branches, are addressed in its new Constitution, which was approved by national referendum in May 1997.
Poland's diligent efforts in applying its political instrument of power, focused on establishing good relations with its seven neighbors who, when taken in aggregate, represent a good portion of the political spectrum, have reduced the pressure on the military for defense of the country. Poland now has no border disputes with its neighbors.
Economy
Again, of the three NATO invitees, Poland's economy has the greatest ability to absorb the costs that come with membership. Although many people may not view Poland's economy as a role model at first glance, the progress made in this decade has been remarkable. Poland began the decade saddled with a low standard of living and a centrally controlled economy run by discredited Communists, not knowledgeable in the operation of a self-sustaining economy and the benefits of a free market. At that time, Poland reached out to the West for help, created strict policies in the budgetary, legal, and trade realms, and unlike Russia followed through with sustained political will. 1 Leszek Balcerowicz, Poland's finance minister during these turbulent times, invited thousands of entrepreneurs to sell what they wanted, where they wanted, for any price they wanted, within loose limits. This daring approach benefited Poland in several ways.
First, it broke the government chokehold on state-owned enterprises, and other economic activities. Second, it encouraged small start-up enterprises while taking away some of the organized crime opportunities rampant in communist countries. The workers left outdated, unproductive factories and set up small retail shop and businesses that produced items the public really wanted to buy. Balcerowicz then guided Poland through a turbulent time by letting insolvent firms fail and forcing them into bankruptcy, preventing them from draining resources from productive parts of the economy. These tough and frequently politically unpopular decisions are now paying off for Poland's future generations. Poland survived the transition to a Western-style market economy and had an annual growth rate of over 5 percent in 1997, one of the highest in Europe. 3 In 1997, the private sector accounted for nearly two-thirds of gross domestic product (GDP), indicating that the private sector is strong. There is still more work to do in this area. The state still controls larger, industrialized firms since the privatization push has been primarily in the small business arena. Large state owned enterprises, coupled with a still viable communist party, continues to cast a shadow over Poland's economy. Convincing foreign companies to commit to long-term investments tends to be more difficult with this specter in the background. Poland's leadership continues in this effort through grass roots campaigns on the benefits of joining NATO, implying greater economic interaction and prosperity will follow. The resulting polls show a high success rate, with as much as 90 percent of the public favoring membership. 4 Poland's leadership, despite its acknowledged economic successes, is guilty of the same political oversight, whether intentional or not, as the other NATO invitees. As much as the benefits of Poland's entry into NATO are trumpeted to the public, the longterm costs are barely mentioned in public forums. The politicians have felt little need to explain the difficult issues that come with NATO membership, including the responsibilities as well as the rights. Thus, the necessities of scaling down the huge Polish army, making it more professional and spending money on new equipment have not figured in wide debate. As the time grows near for planning and obligating funds required to make it all happen, the financial shock may take many Poles by surprise, raising feelings of distrust for the current politicians and thereby giving opportunities to the still active communist party. Again, in Poland as well as in the other countries, the governments are working on funding issues but they appear to be afraid that popular support will plummet if hundreds of millions of dollars in annual expenses become the focus, rather than revamping social welfare or schools.
Military
Reforming the military can be a slow and tedious process with certain especially painful aspects. Establishing civilian control over the military proved to be in this category. Civilian control is a NATO expectation, pushed hard by the Pentagon, and yet remained an almost impossible obstacle because Former President Lech Walesa wanted to keep broad authority in the hands of his generals. Only since Walesa's defeat in the 1995 elections and the adoption of a new constitution calling for subordination of the general staff to the minister of defense has the strong political influence of the Polish military brass diminished. Currently, a general who has United Nations field experience is at the top, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, an ardent proponent of civilian control of the military, is defense minister. A continuing challenge for both of them may well be in clearing out many of the communist-era holdovers in the military intelligence service.
5
The challenge for the defense committee in the Lower House of Poland's parliament is apparent every day. It has no staff. 
Hungary
All free governments are managed by the combined wisdom and folly of the people.
-James A. Garfield
Politics
Political progress and increasing stability continues at a steady pace in Hungary. This is a stable democracy seeking to increase its prosperity and sphere of influence in would be but the first step down the road to an eventual merger with Hungary.
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In 1995, a Hungarian defense ministry official emphasized that "NATO membership does not mean giving up our national interests. On the contrary, it means an opportunity to assert national interests."
because even though NATO's strength lies in dialog aimed at avoiding these types of situations, NATO is not always successful as a peacemaker.
Internally, the path for minorities to freedom and equality is also not completely smooth, but efforts in this endeavor continue. The future Minister of the Interior, Sandor
Pinter, pointed out to the Committee on Human Rights, Minorities and Religious Affairs that it is important to continue dialogue with the Gypsy community, helping to eliminate prejudices, drafting a law against organized crime, and increasing the efficiency of the fight against corruption. 4 The efforts on behalf of ethnic and religious minorities tie in closely with NATO political expectations for prospective members. These external and internal situations in Hungary highlight a key point. Being admitted to NATO certainly does not mean that a country has solved all its problems. It does, however, show that a country reached a stage where it has developed the tools necessary to be able to deal with them. How effectively Hungary uses these tools will be of great interest to other nations who are waiting for their turn for an invitation to join NATO.
Economy
Historically, the transition to a free market economy has been slow and expensive.
The most visible example of this condition is Russia, who some analysts feel, is on the verge of reverting back to a communist-dominated, centrally run economy. Hungary suffered many of the same tribulations in its first 5 years of economic reform, though Hungary would prefer to increase its exports to Russia, but given Russia's economic turmoil no major changes are forecast.
The growing economy is only a partially positive sign that economic reform is on a healthy track. Hungary is still, however, paying its massive debt. Hungary had, in 1996, the highest per capita foreign debt in north central Europe at $2,690. 7 The combination of foreign debt, double digit inflation for the last decade, and looming upgrades to its military structure raise concern about Hungary's ability to pay for the privilege of joining NATO. Just buying 30 new fighter planes, at up to $900 million, must come out of a budget that in 1996 totaled only $16 billion. 8 The resources required to improve the poor condition of Hungarian agriculture could be in direct competition for funds needed for The next chapter focuses on the last of the three invitees, the Czech Republic, and how it is dealing with the challenges that come with the invitation to join NATO.
Notes

Czech Republic
Has it not been established beyond doubt that even the most costly preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war? Well, such an investment will hardly generate any return in the next elections, but it will be more appreciated by generations to come.
-Vaclav Havel
Politics
In the seven-plus years since the "Velvet Revolution" that ended communist rule, the Czech political leaders as they learn they are accountable to the people, and the people must be willing participants in order for membership in NATO to be more than just a financial burden.
Economy
Economically, the Czech report card is mixed. Exports are up sharply and consumption is moderating after several years of overwhelming consumer demand.
Growth, however, remains weak; after peaking at 5.9 percent in 1995, GDP growth slowed to 4.1 percent in 1996 and slumped to approximately 1 percent growth in 1997, one of the catalysts to the previously mentioned political turmoil. This economy, like those of Poland and Hungary, continues to pay a price for reform, most easily seen in the increase in trade and current account deficits. Were these to get out of hand, the ability to meet the financial obligations associated with the upgrades to NATO interoperability standards could be jeopardized. To address these issues, in 1997 the government increased regulation of capital markets and instituted fiscal austerity measures to attack the growing trade deficit, stabilize the currency, and address investor's concerns. The next, and final, chapter of this study addresses the overall conclusions that have been brought out for each of the NATO invitees. This paper then closes out with a possible prognosis and suggested area for future study.
Notes
Conclusions
NATO's great forte is its political capability to deter crises before they escalate.
-General Henry Shelton
What challenges lie ahead as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic ready themselves to become NATO members? In short, progress toward the rule of law and the protection of human rights continues but is far from being perfect, the judicial systems are fragile, financial corruption remains problematic, and the militaries must spend more money than they currently have available to come up to NATO standards in technology, training, and general interoperability. Yet to end on that note would do a great injustice to each of these nations. A quick summary of what they achieved leads to a clearer picture of their abilities to overcome these challenges.
Political readiness
All three countries have had over seven years of solid records as stable democracies.
Poland had a peaceful change of governments in its elections, demonstrating not only political stability but also a functional political process that holds elected officials accountable for their actions. All three invitees have taken numerous steps to underscore their political maturity, pluralism, and respect for human rights. As these countries shed held by the private sector. Business is expanding steadily in these countries, laying the foundation for their improved prosperity and ability to be productive partners in NATO.
The economy in Poland, and to a lesser degree in Hungary and the Czech Republic, is growing rapidly. Whether continued prosperity in the region as a whole will produce similar increases in weapons purchases is debatable. It will take decades with high growth before any on the three countries reach a per capita gross domestic product comparable to those countries after which they wish to model themselves. In competition for resources, both military establishments and domestic arms industries will have a voice, but they will also be up against far larger industrial interests and populations striving to survive in the stiffly competitive environment both within and outside of the EU.
Military Readiness
The three nations will add approximately 200,000 troops and a range of airfields, ports, and lines of communication to the Alliance's collective defense capabilities.
Together, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are already contributing more than 1,000 troops to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia, demonstrating a willingness to contribute their share to NATO actions. The militaries are also more than willing to upgrade to NATO standards, but they must each wait until the political and economic leaders in their countries formulate an effective plan to fund these expenditures.
Prognosis
As stated in this study, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are well on their way to acceptance and integration as full NATO members. 
Area for future study
NATO's open door policy, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, would make an interesting research topic. An in-depth analysis on the impact of this policy on current members, on future members, and on the security of the region would not only build well on this paper, but may also help lay a foundation for formulating future military policies and cooperative actions with other nations.
Epilogue
Since the writing of this paper, the world continued to evolve at a rapid pace. In
March 1999 NATO added Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as full members.
Even as these members were added to the alliance another war started in the Balkans, 
